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The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game is used in several fields due to the emergence of cooperation
among selfish players. Here, we have considered a one-dimensional lattice, where each cell represents
a player, that can cooperate or defect. This one-dimensional geometry allows us to retrieve the
results obtained for regular lattices and to keep track of the system spatio-temporal evolution.
Players play PD with their neighbors and update their state using the Pavlovian Evolutionary
Strategy. If the players receive a positive payoff greater than an aspiration level, they keep their
states and switch them, otherwise. We obtain analitycally the critical temptation values, we present
the cluster patterns that emerge from the players local interaction and we perform an exploration
of paramater space. The numerical results are in accordance to the critical temptation analitycal
results, it confirms that the Pavlovian strategy foment the cooperation among the players and avoid
the defection. The system also presented a new phase in the steady state, the quasi-regular phase,
where several players switch their states during round to round, but the proportion of cooperators
does not alter significantly.
Keywords: Game Theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy, Quasi-regular phase,
Emergence of Cooperation, Critical temptation, Phase transition, Cellular Automata.
I. INTRODUCTION
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a game where two players
confront themselves and each one can either cooperate or
defect. Players receive a payoff R (reward) in the case
of mutual cooperation and a payoff P (punishment) if
they are both defectors. If one player cooperates and the
other defects, they receive S (sucker) and T (tempta-
tion), respectively. These payoff values must satisfy the
inequalities T > R > P > S and T + S < 2R to create
a dilemma [1]. In a single round game the best choice
is the defection, since it assures a higher payoff than co-
operation, independently of the opponent decision (Nash
equilibrium). However, a local minimum occurs under
mutual defection, generating the dilemma.
When the PD is played repeatedly, it is called Iterated
Prisoner Dilemma (IPD). In the computer tournament,
proposed by Axelrod [1, 2] to compare different strategies
playing IPD, a simple strategy, with only one time step
memory, called tit-for-tat (TFT), was by far the most
stable one. The player using TFT cooperates in the first
round and subsequently copies the opponent last round
action. The dilemma and the cooperation, as a profitable
behavior among selfish agents, make the PD the most
prominent game in the Game Theory. It is used to model
problems in several research fields [3, 4, 5, 6].
Here, we consider the IPD, but now each player is a
cell of a one-dimesional automaton and can play with
z neighbors. This geometry is equivalent to the player
in regular lattices with z neighbors. In a non stochastic
IPD game, during time evolution, players interact ac-
cording to deterministic rules. All players play against
their respective neighbors and update their states. This
process is called round and it is the system time unit.
After long enough, the system may reach a steady state,
where the asymptotic cooperators proportion, ρ∞, be-
comes time independent. The player state update process
varies according to the adopted evolutionary strategy [7],
namely: Darwinian Evolutionary Strategy (DES) [8] or
Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy (PES) [9], that are con-
sidered here.
In the DES, the update process uses the strategy of
copying the best adapted player behavior (fittest player),
also known as the “survival of the fittest”. This is equiv-
alent to the natural selection principle of Darwin [10].
The fittest player is the one who receives the greatest
payoff. Each player compares his/her own payoff to the
neighboring ones, and then copy the state of the fittest
neighbor.
For the PES, let us consider the following learning tech-
niques. Win-stay, lose-shift (WSLS) is a general learning
method used for iterated decision problems of all kinds.
It was proposed by Thorndike (1911) [11], assuming that
actions, which yield satisfaction, will be reinforced and
2actions, which yield discomfort, will be weakened. This
strategy is also called Pavlov. Kraines and Kraines [12]
use positive and negative reinforcement to teach an indi-
vidual to respond. In the PD context, an individual is a
player. For example, in the first round, a player chooses
randomly the action C or D (to cooperate or to defect).
He/she plays the game and evaluates the outcome. If
he/she receives a reward due to action C, this individu-
als will be more prone to keep the action C. Otherwise,
if he/she is punished due to the action C, then it will
be more probable that the individual changes his/her ac-
tion to D. This process can be thought as the strategy
‘ ‘never change a winning team”. If it is desirable that
an individual acts like C, then he/she must be rewarded,
or punished, repeatedly according to the player choice to
reinforce the action C. In the PD, under these proposi-
tons, a player keeps a given action when he/she receives
a payoff R or T and switches if his/her payoff is S or
P . Namely, a player keeps his/her action when playing
against a cooperator and switches it when he/she con-
fronts a defector.
Another possible way to use the Pavlov principle is
to set an aspiration level (AL) to the IPD player [13].
The payoff can be lower, equal or greater than the AL. If
they receive a payoff higher than AL, they do not change
their states and switch them, otherwise. In the PES, in
general, all players have the same aspiration level.
Pavlov based strategy is very robust in situations such
as: presence of noise, i.e. a player can switch his/her
state at any moment, with probability p > 0, regardless
the adopted strategy by this player (mutation) [14]; play-
ing against deceiving or profiteers strategies [15]; compe-
tition for surviving, in coevolutionary games [16, 17]. Its
important features are: it does not forgive a defection; it
exploits altruistic strategies while it is not punished with
a defection; it can correct occasional mistakes (noisy envi-
ronment), this does not happen with the tit-for-tat strat-
egy, for instance. Nevertheless, if the Pavlovian strategy
is used as WSLS, with an aspiration level, it presents a
weakness: it can be exploited by defective strategies. It
seems contradictory to be robust against profiters strate-
gies and yet allow to be exploited by defective strategies.
It happens because a given player is concerned only with
his/her own payoff and does not care about the opponent
payoff.
The main variable of the PD is the temptation. The PD
order parameter is the proportion of cooperators. When
the system evolves, it passes through a transient regime
and eventually reaches a steady state, which defines the
phase of the system. If the payoff values are kept con-
stant and only T is varied, the critical temptation values
appear. Critical temptation is a temptation value that
yields a total payoff to the players, which force they to
switch their states, generating a phase transition. Crit-
ical temptation values depend on the adopted strategy,
on the system conectivity and on the neighborhood con-
figuration.
In this paper, we present and solve analytically the
critical temptation for the IPD in one-dimensional cel-
lular automaton with a variable number of interacting
neighbors for Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy. The one-
dimensional geometry allows us to keep track of time
evolution (history in a static bidimensional image) and
the steady quantitative results obtained are similar to
those of square-lattices [8]. In Section II, we introduce
the model. In Section III, we derive analytically the crit-
ical temptation values for the PES. In Section IV, we
present the quasi-regular phase, which is a new phase
that emerged from our numerical results. We also present
the cluster patterns that emerge during time evolution
and the exploration of parameter space (temptation to
defect, T , and initial cooperators proportion, ρ0) for
some connectivity values, z. Final remarks are presented
in Section V. The pattern formation given rise to the
quasi-regular phase are presented in more details in the
Appendix A.
II. THE ONE-DIMENSIONAL MODEL
Consider a one-dimensional cellular automaton with L
cells, where each cell represents a player. Each player
has two possible states: θ = 0 (defector) or θ = 1 (coop-
erator) (see Fig. 1). The automaton has no empty cells,
so that ρc(t) + ρd(t) = 1, with ρc(t) = (1/L)
∑L
i=1 θi(t),
where ρc(t) is the cooperators proportion at time t, and
ρd(t) is the defectors proportion. The initial cooperators
proportion, 0 ≤ ρc(0) ≡ ρ0 ≤ 1, is one of the problem
parameters. The position of every Lρ0 cooperators in
the automaton is set randomly from a uniform deviate.
The initial configuration is the only stochasticity in the
model.
FIG. 1: Cellular automaton in the one-dimensional lattice
with L = 11 players and open boundary condition. Blue cell
(dark gray): cooperator, red one (light gray): defector.
Consider the i-th player, his neighborhood (or connec-
tivity) is given by z = {1, 2, . . . , L}. If z is even, there
are α = z/2 adjacent players to the right-hand side and
another α = z/2 to left-hand side (see Fig. 2a). If z is
odd, each side has α = (z − 1)/2 interactive players and
player i interacts with his/her own state (self-interaction)
(see Fig. 2b) [18, 19, 20]. Nowak and May [17] argue that
self-interaction makes sense, for example, if several ani-
mals (a family) or molecules can occupy a single cell. The
self-interaction is considered an intra-group interaction.
Using the one-dimensional topology, it is possible to
vary the lattice connectivity z to any integer value in
the range 1 ≤ z ≤ L. This is not possible, for in-
stance, in a square lattice, because it is limited to von
3(a)
(b)
FIG. 2: Cellular automaton in the one-dimensional lattice
with L = 11 players. The central player (arrow origin)
interacts with neighbors indicated by arrows. (a) z = 8
(without self-interaction). (b) z = 9 (with self-interaction).
Neumman (z = 4, see Fig. 3a) or Moore (z = 8, see
Fig. 3b) neighborhoods. In a square lattice, if z is dif-
ferent from z = {4; 8; 24}, the neighborhood is asym-
metric. For instance, to obtain z = 6, one must con-
sider the honeycomb lattice. Since the critical tempta-
tion values depend only on the coordination number, this
neighborhood may be considered in a one-dimensional
lattice, where z = {4; 5} corresponds to the von Neum-
man neighborhood, z = {8; 9} matches the Moore one
and z = {6; 7} the honeycomb case, with and with-
out self-interaction, respectively. We have used periodic
boundary conditions (PBC), every player has the same
connectivity. Once the lattice is one-dimensional, the
boundary effect is smaller than observed in d dimensional
lattices [19, 20].
III. ANALYTICAL CALCULATION OF
CRITICAL TEMPTATION
To present the Pavlov critical temptation calculation,
we first briefly review the results obtained by Dura´n and
Mulet [21] for the Darwinian strategy. For the payoff
evaluation, consider the parameters: T , R, P and S.
Consider two players i and j playing PD in a cellular
automaton. The player i payoff with respect to player j
is:
gi,j = T [(1− θi)θj ] +R[θiθj ] +
P [(1− θi)(1 − θj)] + S[(1− θj)θi], (1)
where θk, is the player k state, with k = {1; 2; . . . ; L}.
The total i-th player payoff is: Gi =
∑z
j=1 gi,j . It is
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
FIG. 3: Neighborhood representation in square lattice: (a)
von Neumman, z = 4 and (b) Moore, z = 8. And their
representations in the one-dimensional lattice to: (c) z = 4
and (d) z = 8. Black: central player; dark gray: first
neighbors; and light gray: seconds neighbors. Remember
that for even z there is no self-interaction.
noteworthy that, only if z is odd, there is an extra pay-
off component gi,i, due to self-interaction. From Eq. 1,
the player i payoffs due to the interaction with a single
defector (θj = 0) and a single cooperator (θj = 1), are:
gi,j =
{
P (1 − θi) + Sθi if θj = 0,
T (1− θi) +Rθi if θj = 1.
(2)
The player i payoff, due to interactions with ci coop-
erators within the z neighbors, is: G
(ci)
i (θi) = [T (1 −
θi) + Rθi]ci, and with di defectors: G
(di)
i (θi) = [P (1 −
θi) + Sθi]di. The payoffs sum, due the interactions with
all the z neighbors, leads to the i-th player total pay-
off: Gi(θi) = [T (1 − θi) + Rθi]ci + [P (1 − θi) + Sθi]di.
Since the number of cooperators and defectors in a given
neighborhood are complementary, d = z − c:
Gi(θi) = Tci + P (z − ci) +
[(R− T )ci + (S − P )(z − ci)]θi. (3)
Therefore, the player i total payoff, is given by:
Gi(θi) =
{
Tci + P (z − ci) if θi = 0,
Rci + S(z − ci) if θi = 1.
(4)
In the following, we determine the payoffs for the DES
and PES and the critical temptation values, which de-
pend on the adopted strategy.
1. Darwinian Evolutionary Strategy (DES)
Nowak and May [8] used the parameters set R = 1,
P = S = 0, leaving only one free parameter, the temp-
tation 1 ≤ T ≤ 2, that ensures the conflict conditions.
4These values are different from those originally defined
by Tucker [22] (T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0). The condi-
tions T > R > P > S and T +S < 2R have been relaxed
(P = S; for T = 1, T = R; and for T = 2, T + S = 2R)
without any harm to the DP conflict features. This modi-
fication is known as the Weak Prisoner Dilemma. Placing
the values adopted by Nowak and May for these parame-
ters in Eq. 1, the payoff becomes: gi,j = T (1−θi)θj+θiθj .
A similar result has been obtained by Dura´n and Mulet
[21]: gi,j = T (1− θiθj)θj + θiθj . The difference between
our result and the Dura´n and Mulet one is the presence
of θj multiplying θi inside the parentesis, which it is un-
necessary and, in this case, it does not alter the result.
However, we notice that, if the players state can as-
sume rational values, Dura´n and Mulet result is not
valid. This situation occurs in the Continuous Prisoner’s
Dilemma (CPD) [23, 24, 25], where a player has a co-
operation level (CL), with 0 ≤ CL ≤ 1, instead of only
defecting or cooperating. For the CPD our results give
the correct payoff values, considering the linear interpo-
lation for intermediate values.
Considering R = 1, P = S = 0 in Eq. 3, we have
Gi(θi) = [T − (T − 1)θi]ci. Notice that: (i) the pay-
off for a cooperator who plays with ci cooperators is
G
(ci)
i (θi = 1) = ci; while, (ii) a defector who plays with
ci cooperators has a payoff equal to G
(ci)
i (θi = 0) = ciT .
For T > 1: (i) G
(ci)
i (θi = 0) > G
(ci)
i (θi = 1); and (ii)
G
(c)
i (θ) ≥ G
(c−1)
i (θ). In DES, the payoff of each player is
always non-negative, Gi ≥ 0. After all players calculate
their payoffs, they update their states. During this pro-
cess, each player i compares his/her payoff Gi with Gk,
where Gk is the payoff of his/her k-th neighbor, with
k = {1; 2; . . . ; z}. If Gi < Gk and Gk = max[G ∈ z],
player i replicates the player k state, otherwise he/she
maintains his/her current state.
The system evolves till it eventually reaches the steady
state, where the cooperators proportion ρ∞ is station-
ary. The ρ∞ phase transitions occur when the temp-
tation value passes through critical values Tc. In the
conflict region, 1 < T < 2, these transitions have been
calculated [21]: Tc(n,m) = (z − n)/(z − n −m), where
0 ≤ n < z and 1 ≤ m ≤ int[(z − n − 1)/2] are
integers1. For example, for z = 8, these values are
Tc = (8/7, 8/6, 8/5, 8/4).
2. Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy (PES)
Following the same reasoning line as used for the DES,
we present for the first time the critical temptation values
calculation for the PES. The parameters used are P =
1 For x positive, the function int(x) gives the largest integer less
than or equal to x.
−R and S = −T , which are placed in Eq. 4:
Gi(θi) =
{
Tci −R(z − ci) if θi = 0,
Rci − T (z − ci) if θi = 1.
(5)
For system using PES, each player payoff can be either
positive or negative in the range: −zT < Gi < zT (Eq. 5
extreme cases are: ci = 0 and ci = z).
Each player i evaluates his/her payoff Gi. If the payoff
is greater than the aspiration level (Gi > AL, with AL =
0), the player maintains his/her current state, otherwise,
he/she switches the current state. We have defined the
aspiration level as a null payoff, but any other value can
be choosen.
For player i to switch his/her state, it is necessary
that his/her payoff be null or negative, that is: Gi(θi) ≤
0. Applying this condition to the null payoff situation
(Gi(θi) = 0) in Eq. 5, one has:
Gi(θi) =
{
ciT − (z − ci)R ≤ 0 if θi = 0,
ciR − (z − ci)T ≤ 0 if θi = 1.
(6)
For a defector to maintain his/her current state, T
must provides a null gain: ciTc − (z − ci)R = 0, which
leads to critical temptation value: Tc = [(z − ci)/ci]R,
and in a cooperator case, the null payoff occurs when
ciR − (z − ci)Tc = 0 and Tc = [ci/(z − ci)]R. These two
cases can be written by a simple equation:
Tc(z, ci) =
(
z − ci
ci
)(−1)θi
R. (7)
The relevant variable is [(z − ci)/ci]
θi , which strongly
contrasts to the DES one: (z − n)/(z − n − m). How-
ever, notice that, as the DES, it does not depend on the
configuration of the ci cooperators within the z neigh-
bors, it depends only on the the ci and z values. For this
reason, we can use the one-dimensional geometry in the
following.
An interesting feature observed for Tc in PES is its
dependence on the player state. Critical temptation val-
ues are the same for defectors and cooperators, but they
appear in reverse order. For example, consider a coop-
erator playing against z = 4 neighbors, if in the neigh-
borhood there is no cooperator, Tc(4, 0) = 0, one co-
operator, Tc(4, 1) = 1/3R, and so on, then Tc(4, ci) =
{0; 1/3R; 1/2R; 3R; ∞}, for ci = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Now
consider a defector in the same situation, Tc(4, ci) =
{∞; 3R; 1/2R; 1/3R; 0}, for ci = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS: EMERGENCE OF
THE NEW QUASI-REGULAR PHASE
We have written a numerical code to simulate the PD
adopting the PES in one-dimensional cellular automaton.
The parameters are: L = 1, 000 cells, with Lρ0 being
the number of cooperators and the remaining ones the
5number of defectors. To be statistically meaningful, the
asymptotic proportion of cooperators, ρ∞, are averages
obtained for 1, 000 realizations. The quantity T varies in
steps ∆T = 0.01 in the range 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 and ρ0 varies
in steps ∆ρ0 = 0.1 in the range 0 < ρ0 < 1. The spatio-
temporal patterns yielded by the cooperative/defective
clusters are presented using smaller systems than the
used to calculate ρ∞.
Despite the equivalence with d dimensional lattices in
the critical temptation values determination, the one-
dimensional case has several advantages [19, 20]: it is
easier to explain the cooperative/defective clusters in-
vasion process and also the ρ∞ oscillations during the
steady regime as observed in the Nowak and May pio-
neer work [8, 17]. In addition to these phenomena expla-
nation, it is also possible to save the system history in
a single static image (see the spatio-temporal patterns).
This is impossible to perform in a two-dimensional sys-
tem, for example, where it is necessary a movie to observe
the time evolution.
In the steady state, the system can reach the coopera-
tive, chaotic or defective phases, when adopting the DES
and the cooperative or quasi-regular phases (which was
not characterized before), adopting the PES. The coop-
erative phase is characterized by the majority of players
being cooperators. If the majority of players are defec-
tors, the system is in the defective phase. These two
phases are not sensible to the initial configuration. In
these cases the fluctuations of ρ∞ (standard deviation
- SD) is almost null. In contrast, the chaotic phase is
highly sensitivity to small changes in the initial configu-
ration (larger ρ∞ fluctuations - SD ∼ 0.5).
In the quasi-regular phase, ρ∞ oscillates a little around
ρ∞ ∼ 0.5, however there is a very large number of play-
ers, who switch their states. However, these switching
balance themselves. And the system is not sensible to the
initial configuration presenting a small SD, with SD ∼ 0
over almost all the parameter space.
After the transient regime, the system reaches the
steady state with the asymptotic ρ∞. Adopting the PES,
the system can present only the cooperative or quasi-
regular phases. The defective and chaotic phases are ab-
sent with the PES. The defective phase does not occur
because a defective cluster yields negative payoff to its
members. Thus, they change their states when this hap-
pens. The chaotic phase absence is confirmed by the
small standard deviation, SD ∼ 0 all over the parameter
space.
In the following we show the phase-diagram of systems
adopting the PES, where are present the cooperative and
quasi-regular phases and the patterns that emerge dur-
ing the transient time and the ones which persist in the
steady state. The patterns are a visual way to under-
stand the phases.
A. Transient and Steady Regimes: exploration of
the parameter space
To depict the asymptotic cooperators proportion in
the steady state, we have used surfaces to show ρ∞ as
a function of T and ρ0. Figs. 4 and 5 display these ρ∞
surfaces and their standard deviation for even (without
self-interaction) and odd z values (with self-interaction),
respectively. These phase-diagram present abrupt varia-
tions when the system passes through Tc, and, eventually,
it may go from cooperative to quasi-regular phase.
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(a) ρ∞ for z = 2.
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(c) ρ∞ for z = 8
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(f) ρ∞ standard deviation for
z = 30.
FIG. 4: ρ∞ surface as function of the temptation value,
T , and the initial cooperators proportion, ρ0, for
z = {2; 8; 30}.
An interesting aspect is the ρ∞ symmetry with respect
to the ρ0 = 1/2, that is, ρ∞(ρ0 = 1/2 − φ) = ρ∞(ρ0 =
1/2+φ) with 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1/2. The self-interaction presence
or absence, changes Tc values and may change the phase
(cooperative or quasi-regular) for the same region in the
parameter space. Notice that there are few regions where
the standard deviation SD is significant.
In the PES, if all players are cooperators (ρ0 = 1), they
always receive a positive payoff, and no player changes
his/her state, therefore ρ∞(T ; ρ0 = 1; z) = 1. Oth-
erwise, if all players are defectors (ρ0 = 0), in the first
round, all players receive a negative payoff, and all of
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(a) ρ∞ for z = 3.
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(c) ρ∞ for z = 9
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(e) ρ∞ for z = 29
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FIG. 5: ρ∞ surface as function of the temptation value,
T , and the initial cooperators temptation, ρ0, for
z = {3; 9; 29}.
them switch their states, returning to the previous sit-
uation, consequently, ρ∞(T ; ρ0 = 0; z) = 1. Thus, the
ρ∞ symmetry around ρ0 = 1/2 is a consequence of the
PES. For ρ0 = β, rN players receive a positive payoff and
(1− r)N players a negative payoff, whether, ρ0 = 1− β,
(1 − r)N players receive positive payoff and rN players
negative payoff, generating the symmetry.
The surface projection ρ∞(T, ρ0, z) at plane ρ∞T
shows ρ∞ as function of T for different ρ0 values. In Fig-
ure 6, one sees the plots for some even and odd z values.
The transitions in ρ∞ can be seen when the parameter T
passes through critical temptation thresholds, Tc, given
by Eq. 7. In the plots, the Tc values marked by dashed
vertical lines. For example, in Fig. 6c (z = 8 - without
self-interaction) Tc = 5/3. Meanwhile, in Fig. 6d (z = 9
- with self-interaction) Tc = {5/4; 2}.
The results show that the cooperative phase is more
prominent than quasi-regular one. Increasing the z val-
ues, the quantity of Tc values raises. When the system
goes through Tc, ρ∞ varies. The non dependence on a
group, provides more liberty to each player seek the best
outcome that satisfy his/her own aspiration level. In this
case, the worst result is the homogeneity among the play-
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FIG. 6: Asymptotic cooperator proportion (ρ∞) as
function of temptation to defect T , for
z = {2; 3; 8; 9; 29; 30}. The vertical dashed lines sign
Tc in plots and these values are given by Eq. 7. Blue:
ρ0 = 0.5; green: ρ0 = 0.6; red: ρ0 = 0.7; cyan: ρ0 = 0.8;
magenta: ρ0 = 0.9.
ers payoff (quasi-regular phase), instead of cooperation,
the best result, but much better than the defection.
B. Spatio-temporal patterns
The patterns formed by cooperative/defective clusters
that emerge in the system are yielded from local interac-
tions among players. When the players adopt the DES,
the differences between the border players payoff are fun-
damental to determine the system dynamics [19]. While
in the PES, these border payoff differences are not as
crucial as in the DES. For a more detailed explanation
of patterns formation, see the Appendix A. The spatio-
temporal representation show us that these clusters can
form fingers and gliders and they can interact.
One may notice that clusters composed exclusively by
cooperators sustain itself by the maintenance of cooper-
ation among them. However, cooperation remains only
when the size of the cooperative cluster is large enough to
maintain a positive payoff to its members. The members
7placed in the borders are exploited by defectors, but they
do not switch their states because their payoffs are posi-
tive, despite they are lower than the payoff of exploiters
and inner players of the cooperative cluster.
If a defective cluster is large enough to produce nega-
tive payoffs to their members, it will not be stable. Thus,
players with negative payoffs, will switch their states im-
mediately. Thereby, Tragedy of Commons2 does not oc-
cur, because the players negative payoff does not per-
sist for more than one round, such as for players adopt-
ing the DES. In this way, the population mean payoff
is higher adopting the PES than the DES, where the
Tragedy of Commons takes longer to vanish (when it
vanishes) [19, 20]. In the PES, a player uses his/her
own payoff to decide whether he/she will switch his/her
state or not. It is an individual decision based on the
personal aspiration level. Therefore, collective features,
i.e. players switching their states due the environment
(group) where they are inserted, may not occur.
Different neighborhood configurations may generate
positive or negative payoffs for the players. It is sim-
ple to calculate the maximum defective cluster size and
the minimum cooperative cluster size, which can remain
together during the system evolution (stable clusters).
In the cooperative cluster case, player i does not switch
his/her state, if there are at least cmin cooperators in
his/her neighborhood. This guarantees a positive payoff
Gcmini (θi = 1) > 0, thus, from Eq. 3 one has:
cmin > z
(
1
1 +R/T
)
. (8)
The situation is reversed in the defective cluster case. In
this case, the player i must have in his/her neighborhood
a maximum of dmax defectors, so that G
dmax
i (θi = 0) > 0,
and:
dmax < z
(
1
1 +R/T
)
. (9)
A finger is a cluster that extends itself along a straight
line during time evolution. It can be simple (flat one),
or complex (composed by regular oscillations, like a saw-
tooth, for example). The finger interior can be composed
by cooperators/defectors or by intricated combinations of
cooperators and defectors. It may present symmetry with
respect to central player of the pattern and periodicity in
the player states. A glider is a cluster that extends itself
diagonally, and it has the same features of the fingers.
In short, defective fingers may be composed of at most
dmax defectors, and cooperative ones of at least cmin coop-
erators. For instance, for z = 2, fingers formed by up to
2 The Tragedy of Commons occurs when multiple individuals act
independently, aiming only his own interest. When this action is
done by multiple individuals simultaneously, it can destroy the
advantage desired by all of them, for example, finishing the de-
sired resources in the environment. However it is not the purpose
of anyone.
two players are always smooth and continuous (see simple
and complex fingers in the Appendix A). In general, the
stable clusters are the cooperative ones (with at least cmin
cooperators) and small defective ones. Defective clusters
that are greater than dmax destabilize themselves rapidly
in few rounds.
The transient regime is the necessary time to cease the
patterns interactions or stabilize the patterns propaga-
tion and it varies depending on the parameters set used
(see Fig. 7). Other possibility is the emergence of the
quasi-regular phase, which is stationary, but there is a
very large number of players who switch their states, but
do not emerge fingers or gliders, and ρ∞ ∼ 0.5.
The intersection among cluster patterns generates very
interesting structures. For example, Fig. 7 illustrates the
presence of gliders3 that interact among themselves and
with fingers. These interactions can generate either sim-
ple (Fig. 7a-7d) or complex (Fig. 7c) fingers.
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FIG. 7: Illustration of intersections of glider with
fingers and others glider. The parameters of these
simulations are: L = 500, t = 300 and (a) T = 1.40,
ρ0 = 0.7, z = 14 (without self-interaction); (b) T = 1.70,
ρ0 = 0.3, z = 26 (without self-interaction); (c) T = 1.40,
ρ0 = 0.5, z = 12 (without self-interaction); and (d)
T = 1.40, ρ0 = 0.3, z = 24 (without self-interaction).
One can understand the quasi-regular phase by observ-
ing the cooperative/defective clusters behavior. If defec-
tors of a particular cluster receive a negative payoff at
moment t, these players switch their status to coopera-
tors at t+1. If this action is synchronized among different
clusters, cooperation may emerge. Otherwise, if they are
3 In systems that adopt the DES, the inclination of glider is de-
termined by the direction of upgrade of players states. On the
other hand, if the system adopts the PES, the glider can propa-
gate both from left to right-hand side or vice-versa.
8not synchronized and one cluster switches at the instant
t and its neighbors at the instant t+ 1 these clusters al-
ternate between cooperation and defection, and there is
a balance among cooperators that switch their states to
defectors and vice-versa keeping the proportion of coop-
erators almost constant, with small oscillations.
In Figs. 8-9, one sees some examples where the syn-
chronization among clusters had not occurred, ρ∞ ∼ 0.5
and many players switch their states at each round, giv-
ing rise to the quasi-regular phase. The triangles appear
when adjacent defectors switch their states to coopera-
tion at the same time. In Fig. 8a, a transient followed by
the quasi-regular phase with periodicity is presented. It
also appears another triangular pattern, but its interior
is not composed exclusively by cooperators or defectors,
but by complex cooperative and defective fingers. This
pattern is a triangle, with sides not well defined, which we
call triangle-like, see Fig. 8a. In Fig. 8b, one can notice
that the cooperative clusters size are larger for system
with higher connectivity, but the system phase remains
quasi-regular.
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FIG. 8: Formation and evolution of the quasi-regular
system. The parameters of these simulations are:
L = 500, t = 300 and (a) T = 1.90, ρ0 = 0.3, e z = 26
(without self-interaction) and (b) T = 1.90, ρ0 = 0.5,
and z = 29 (with self-interaction). Note the presence of
a triangle-like at time t = 50 at players 200-250.
In Fig. 9, one sees that few defective clusters are
enough to drive the system to quasi-regular phase in-
stead of cooperative one, despite the high initial cooper-
ators proportion, this occurs because T = 2. In Fig. 9a,
one can see a defective clusters zoom. Fig. 9b illustrates
a so-called triangle-like that emerges at t = 260 around
player 160.
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FIG. 9: Formation and evolution of the quasi-regular
system. The parameters of this simulation are:
L = 500, t = 300, T = 2.00, ρ0 = 0.9 and z = 6 (without
self-interaction). (a) zoom of the region around to t = 1
for the players close to the player 90; (b) zoom of the
region: t = 260 around player 160.
There are T intervals where increases or decreases in
its value do not alter the system dynamics and ρ∞ for
a same system (identical cooperators initial configura-
tion and z). In Fig. 10, for z = 24, when the sys-
tem passes through the critical temptation values Tc =
{1; 13/11; 7/5; 15/11; 8/5; 17/9}, transient changes
and patterns increase in quantity and variety, these are
the phase transitions. For instance, from T = 13/11 to
T = 1.19 (see Figs. 10c), appears some gliders in the
initial steps and a complex finger emerges and propa-
gate during all the system evolution. From T = 1.39 to
T = 7/5 (see Figs. 10d) the initial gliders are increased
and they propagate during time evolution, not emerging
the finger as occured before. Furthermore, for 1 ≤ T < 2,
the system presents the cooperative phase in the steady
regime and for T = 2 (see Fig. 10g), the system enters
in the quasi-regular phase.
For systems adopting the PES, analyzing the clusters
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FIG. 10: Sequence of numerical simulations that show
how the temptation T change alter the
cooperative/defective clusters patterns. In the interval
between the presented T values do not occur changes in
patterns. The parameters of these simulations are:
L = 500, t = 300, ρ0 = 0.3 and z = 24 (without
self-interaction). To: (a) T = 1.00; (b) T = 1.01; (c)
T = 1.19; (d) T = 1.40; (e) T = 1.41; (f) T = 1.67; and
(g) T = 2.00.
patterns we see that the evolution depends strongly on
the neighborhood composition of the cluster. However,
the player location in this neighborhood (configuration)
is irrelevant for the total payoff determination. We have
noticed also that the transient and steady regimes depend
on the system parameters, when T varies, the transient
regime duration changes. In the steady regime, there are
changes in the ρ∞ value when T passes through the Tc
values. A system can present the cooperative or quasi-
regular phases. In the quasi-regular phase, the system
can yield a transient and after it achieves a periodic ρ∞
oscillation.
V. CONCLUSION
The one-dimensional cellular automata, where each
cell is a player who plays the Prisoner Dilemma with z
neighbors, adopting the Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy
have been explored here. We have obtained the analyt-
ical value of Tc. Using numerical results we have vali-
dated the existence of the phases transition, that have
been analytically calculated. We also analyzed the sta-
tionary state of the system and explained the patterns
of the clusters due the local interactions of players, given
rise to a new phase, the quasi-regular one.
In short, our results are: (i) phases transitions occur
in well defined values of temptation Tc that were defined
analyticaly; (ii) existence of the cooperative and quasi-
regular phases, which depend on the temptation value to
defect; (iii) absence of the defective and chaotic phases;
(iv) the Tragedy of the Commons does not take place;
(v) the cooperation is more remarkable than in systems
that adopt DES.
The mean payoff of players is greater when the players
are concerned only with their own payoff. If the players
copy the action of the neighbor who received the largest
payoff, they may worsen the outcome of the whole sys-
tem. Thus, the comparison and therefore, the greed by
the greatest payoff, can cause the ruin of all. In the sit-
uation where there is no way to coordinate the moves
of players, the best would that everyone seek to have a
positive payoff, even this positive payoff is not the max-
imum possible. Thus they could maximize the payoff of
the population as a whole.
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APPENDIX A: PATTERNS FORMATION
In the following we analyze particular cases to explain
the dynamics of evolution of these systems. In the zoom
of the images of Fig. 11, one sees that the complex finger
with three players have the pattern4: {D D D → D C
D} and with thirteen players the pattern is: {D D D C
4 C: cooperator player, D: defector one. The player at center of
the pattern is printed in boldface.
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D D D C D D D C D → D C D D D C D D D C D D
D}. The pattern of 13 players is a composition formed
by the alternation of the patterns of three players, with
overlap (see Fig. 11b). In other words, the patterns {DD
D} and {D C D} combine themselves so that the third
player of one pattern is the first of the following one.
Other combinations formed by the addition of patterns
with or without overlapping of edges can be observed.
+ DC
D D D
D
D D DD D D
DCD DCD
(b)
FIG. 11: Formation and evolution of smooth and
complex fingers. Parameters of this simulation are:
L = 500, t = 300, T = 2.00, ρ0 = 0.3 and z = 3 (with
self-interaction). (a) zoom of the marked area. (b)
Formation of a pattern composed from elementary
patterns.
In the zoom of Fig. 12 there are simple fingers with
twelve defectors at most and also a complex one with the
pattern: {6D 3C 4D 3C 6D → 6D 3D 4C 3D 6D}. In
the zooms of Fig. 13, emerging fingers have the pattern:
Fig. 13a: {4D C 3D 3C D 4D → 4D D 3C 3D C 4D}
and Fig. 13b: {C D 2C D 2C D C → C D C 3D C D C
→ 3D 3C 3D → 2D C 3D C 2D → D C D 3C D C D
→ D C 5D C D → C D 5C D C}. Note the periodicity
present in these patterns.
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